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No place is safe – no place is at  
peace. There is no place where a 
woman and her daughter can hide 
and be at peace. The war comes 
through the air, bombs drop in the 
night. Quiet people go out in the 
morning, and see air-fleets passing 




1. THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF AIR WARFARE 
 
As the most recent conflicts suggest, air warfare has known an exponential 
growth. This is caused by several factors: suffice it to mention the swiftness of the 
intervention, the possibility to strike remote targets (thanks to in-flight refuelling) and to 
minimize the attacker’s casualties (thanks to the aircratft’s limited vulnerability against 
an enemy with poor technology and to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles). This latter 
asset is nowadays of paramount importance, because of the scant bent of the public 
opinion for the participation to financially expensive and bloody conflicts.2 On the other 
hand, air warfare has a high economic cost, due, inter alia, to the quick obsolescence of 
the weapons employed.  
Notwithstanding this increasing recourse to military aerial operations, the law of 
air warfare has not been completely codified yet. The Rules drafted in 1923 by a 
Commission of experts on behalf of the Washington Conference on the limitation of 
armament (1921-1922) have never been converted into a treaty, even though some 
authors consider them as reflecting customary law.3 Conventional rules can be found in 
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the 1899 (IV, 1) and 1907 (XIV) Hague Declarations prohibiting the discharge of 
projectiles and explosives from balloons (no longer in force4), in the Regulations 
annexed to the IV Hague Convention of 1907, in the 1949 II and III Geneva 
Conventions and in the 1977 Additional Protocol I, Article 49 (3) of which provides that 
Section I of Part IV of the Protocol applies to ‘any land, air or sea warfare which may 
affect the civilian population, individual civilians or civilian objects on land’ and ‘to all 
attacks from the sea or from the air against objectives on land’.5 Taking these provisions 
into account, the present article explores how the concept of ‘military objective’ in air-
to-ground bombardment has evolved during the most recent conflicts which involved 
the use of air power, namely Operation Desert Storm6 and Operation Iraqi Freedom in 
Iraq,7 Operation Allied Force in Kosovo,8 and Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan.9 The article also focuses on the most recent military documents and 
manuals on air warfare, with particular regard to those of the United States: the 
inclusion of a rule in a State’s manual demonstrates with sufficient certainty that it 
regards it as binding and ‘[t]he impact of the practice of States such as the United States 




2. NON-COMBATANT IMMUNITY ISSUES  
 
The first reference to the principle of distinction with specific regard to air warfare 
is to be found in Article 24 (1) of the above mentioned 1923 Hague Rules, which states 
that ‘[a]erial bombardment is legitimate only when directed at a military objective’.11 
Article 48 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions provides for the 
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obligation of States parties to distinguish between the civilian population and 
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and to direct operations 
only against the latter. If a person is a civilian under Article 50 (1) of Additional 
Protocol I,12 he/she is not a military objective and cannot be intentionally attacked, not 
even by way of reprisals (Article 51 (2) and (6), and Article 52 (1)). If the attack is ‘of a 
nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction’, 
it would be indiscriminate and thus prohibited.13 These obligations also apply to air 
bombardments, both massive and small-scale: in fact, Article 49 (1) of Protocol I 
broadly defines the term ‘attacks’ as ‘acts of violence against the adversary, whether in 
offence or in defence’, regardless of the means employed. The principle of distinction 
also appears in Article 13 (2) of Additional Protocol II, which deals with non-
international armed conflicts, but only with regard to civilian individuals and not also to 
civilian objects.14  
Notwithstanding the contrary practice during the Second World War,15 the 
customary status of the principle of distinction as contained in Additional Protocol I is 
nowadays well established, and air bombardments are no exception to it.16 No State has 
denied its binding character and it has been incorporated in virtually all military 
manuals and pamphlets, such as the 1992 German Joint Service Regulations17, the 1976 
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USAF Pamphlet18, the 1998 USAF Intelligence Targeting Guide,19 the 2002 US Joint 
Doctrine for Targeting,20 and the 2004 UK Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict.21 
Similarly, Article 42 of the 1938 Italian Law of War (still in force) prohibits 
bombardments the only aim of which is to hit the civilian population or to destroy or 
damage to non-military related property.22 On 19 December 1969, the UN General 
Assembly adopted resolution 2444 by unanimous vote, which expressly recognizes the 
principle of civilian immunity and its complementary principle requiring the warring 
parties to distinguish civilians from combatants at all times.23 The United States 
acknowledged that the resolution, which does not distinguish between different kinds of 
warfare and therefore also applies to aerial bombardment, is declaratory of customary 
law.24 During the 1991 Gulf War, Colin Powell, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, declared that the provisions of Protocol I had been applied since they constituted 
customary law and that the principle of distinction was respected by US armed forces.25 
During Operation Allied Force, the NATO spokesperson, Jamie Shea, in a briefing, 
affirmed that ‘[c]ustomary international law requires that combatants shall “at all times 
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and shall direct their 
operations only against military objectives”’.26 NATO’s Secretary General, Robertson, 
then declared that ‘our targets are military and do not involve civilian or urban 
targets’.27 This view was upheld by the the Final Report of the Committee established 
by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) to review the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia, which argued that, 
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although NATO had made some mistakes, it never intentionally targeted civilians.28 
Iraqi and Yugoslavian complaints about attacks on civilians by the United States and its 
allies also confirm the existence of an opinio juris on the binding character of the 
principle of distinction, although the two countries did not eventually respect such 
principle. Finally, the principle of distinction has also been firmly upheld by national 
and international courts: in particular, according to the 1996 International Court of 
Justice (ICJ)’s Advisory Opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, 
the obligation to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants is one of the 
cardinal principles of humanitarian law and is to be observed by all States whether or 
not they have ratified the conventions that contain it.29 According to the ICTY, ‘it is 
now a universally recognised principle … that deliberate attacks on civilians or civilian 
objects are absolutely prohibited by international humanitarian law’.30  
Contemporary air warfare, however, has developed some features that the existing 
rules do not take expressly into account. To start with, doubts can be raised about the 
lawfulness of US aircraft flying at 15,000 feet to minimize risks of being shot down by 
the Serb anti-aircraft artillery during the Kosovo war:31 at that height, pilots were unable 
to have visual confirmation of the nature of the target, or that civilians had not moved 
into the area.32 At least some bombardments by American aircraft during Operation 
Enduring Freedom were carried out from above 30,000 feet where anti-aircraft artillery 
and Stinger missiles could not reach them.33 In Afghanistan, the United States also 
employed an unmanned aerial vehicle, which was reported to have unintentionally hit 
people: however, the principle of distinction requires that ‘[t]here must be some human 
being, even if he is geographically removed from the target, who obtains information in 
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real-time and decides whether or not the target is legitimate’.34 The same can be said 
about night bombing, if this makes impossible for the pilot to comply with the principle 
of distinction and with Article 51 (4) (c) of Additional Protocol I, which reflects 
customary law.35 Thus, in case of risks for civilians, the attack should be carried out in 
daylight, evaluating the dangers for pilots against the possible military advantage to be 
gained by the operation.36 The US practice of prioritising the protection of its own 
combatants with respect to the enemy’s civilians in order not to lose the support of the 
public opinion also erodes the principle of proportionality embodied in Article 51 (5) 
(b) and violates Article 57 (2) of Additional Protocol I, which provides for the attacker’s 
obligation to take all reasonable precautions to avoid loss of civilians and damage to 
civilian property (this provision is considered customary by the United States37 and by 
the ICTY38). The Europeans seem to have adopted a stricter, more correct position. 
According to the 1996 British defence doctrine, ‘there may be occasions when a 
commander will have to accept a higher level of risk to his own forces in order to avoid 
or reduce collateral damage to the enemy’s civil population’,39 while the German Joint 
Services Regulations forbid bombardments which cannot be directed at a specific 
military objective (para 455) and obliges military leaders to ‘choose means and methods 
minimizing incidental injury and damage to civilian life and objects’ (para 457). It is 
worth noting that, in the second half of Operation Allied Force, NATO changed its rules 
of engagement to allow planes fly as low as 6,000 feet and to require visual 
confirmation of the nature of the target,40 and in Operation Enduring Freedom for the 
first time the United States employed special operation forces as ground spotters to 
determine the coordinates for emerging targets to be attacked with satellite-guided 
bombs.41 
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According to Article 50 (3) of Additional Protocol I, ‘the presence within the 
civilian population of individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians 
does not deprive the population of its civilian character’. In Kosovo, NATO forces 
attacked a large convoy of vehicles southeast of Djakovica. After verifying the target 
again, it was established that there were civilian vehicles intermingled with the military 
ones, and the attack was immediately suspended.42 On the contrary, the village of 
Koriša was bombed on 13 May 1999, causing 87 deaths among Albanian civilians, 
since it was believed that Serbian forces had established their headquarters there, in a 
block of residential apartments.43 However, NATO insisted that an intended legitimate 
target had been hit and that there was no knowledge of the presence of civilians. One 
can also question the legitimacy of the US policy to target some residential areas in 
Afghanistan: according to the Pentagon, the targets were legitimate because they 
‘housed Taliban and al-Qaeda leadership’.44 On 20 December 2001, the US bombed a 
convoy in the Paktia province because it was supposed to carry Taliban leaders and 
because a US aircraft had been fired upon by anti-aircraft missiles launched from it, but, 
according to other sources, the convoy was taking tribal elders to the inauguration of the 
new Karzai government. A village nearby was also bombed, because the convoy 
stopped in front of it, trying to leave the valley by another road. The Pentagon declared 
that the area was an active staging and coordinating base for Al-Qaeda activities and 
preparations for escape from Afghanistan,45 and that there was absolute intelligence that 
the convoy hosted terrorists.46 The death toll ranged from 15-65, all allegations being 
denied by US officials.  
The presence of civilians close to military objectives may not be accidental. 
During Operation Desert Storm, Iraq placed military helicopters in residential areas and 
military supplies in mosques, schools and hospitals hoping to preserve them from the 
Coalition’s attacks.47 During the Kosovo war, the Yugoslav military often accompanied 
convoys of internally displaced persons with military material and personnel in order to 
shield them from possible attacks.48 In 2003, the Iraqi authorities put anti-aircraft guns 
in civilian areas and military forces took over houses in residential districts, using 
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 Human shields were probably also used in the Koriša village, attacked by NATO aircraft on 1 May 
1999 (Amnesty International above n 26 at  63-67). 
 8 
hospitals, schools and mosques to store military equipment.49 However, the fact that the 
enemy intentionally moves his own civilians close to military objectives as human 
shields, breaching Article 52 (7) of Additional Protocol I, does not exempt the attacker 
from respecting the principle of distinction, even though, as far as customary law is 
concerned, the responsibility would fall upon the belligerent that puts the civilians at 
risk.50 The most recent practice, though, shows that the presence, if forced, of civilians 
near military objectives does not discourage attacks against such objectives: the attacks 
are lawful providing that the principle of proportionality between the collateral damage 
and the gained military advantage is respected.51 For instance, the Taliban used the 
village of Ishaq Suleiman to cover their tanks and artillery: according to the Pentagon 
spokesperson, despite being situated in villages, the trucks and equipment were still 
authorized military targets.52 The case of the two Iraqi MiG-21 aircraft located near the 
ziggurat at Ur in February 1991 is well-known: the US declarations implied that the 
attack would have been lawful and that it was not carried out only because the aircraft, 
without servicing equipment and runaway nearby, were unusable and their destruction 
would have been pointless.53 
The immunity from attacks ends only if the civilians ‘take a direct part in 
hostilities’ (Article 51 (3) of Additional Protocol I54). The phrase ‘direct part’ is 
nowhere defined in the Protocol. Of course, this is the case of civilians taking guns and 
using them against the enemy’s military forces. This is also true for retreating soldiers. 
Both in Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Coalitions led by the 
United States attacked by air and decimated the retreating divisions of the Iraqi army, 
especially the notorious Republican Guard. Only hors de combat persons, such as 
prisoners of war, cannot be attacked, whilst retreating soldiers have neither surrendered 
nor are in the power of the enemy.55 Indeed, they are capable of defending themselves 
and to take up arms again unless they clearly express the intention to give in, so they 
may be targeted. But, apart from the members of the armed forces, who takes direct part 
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in hostilities in contemporary warfare? In Operation Iraqi Freedom some civilians, such 
as security personnel, Fedayeen, Ba’ath Party members and police also acted as 
combatants.56 The ‘militia’ character of the Taliban armed forces entailed targeting 
residences among other sites and, thus, some residential areas. Nonetheless, according 
to the ICTY, if the participation is purely voluntary and there is no disciplinary sanction 
for those who fail to comply with their duties, their combatant status can be 
questioned.57 On the other hand, if a civilian fills a traditionally military position, 
whether or not he wears a uniform, it is this author’s opinion that he/she takes direct 
part in the hostilities: it is his function, not his clothes, that must be taken into account.58  
There is a growing trend to let civilian perform military functions and to employ 
them in the theatre of operations. Examples are technicians and embedded journalists, 
whose role is more and more important because of the higher technological level of 
today’s warfare and the importance of the media.59 Since they are not forced to do so, 
they cannot be considered human shields. However, in air operations, it would be 
almost impossible for the pilot or the commander to establish before or during the attack 
if such personnel is civilian or military and to distinguish the ones from the others. This 
raises the problem of whether civilians performing military or military-related functions 
should be considered and to what amount in evaluating the excessiveness of collateral 
damage in the light of the principle of proportionality. As to the so-called quasi-
combatants (eg, people working in ammunitions factories), they do not loose their 
civilian status, since they do not take direct part in the hostilities: the war can be won 
simply by overcoming the enemy’s combatants, notwithstanding the zeal of its 
armament producers.60 Therefore, it is legitimate to target the ammunition factory where 
and when civilians are working (provided that this complies with the principle of 
proportionality),61 but the workers cannot be bombed when they are home just because 
they participate indirectly in the enemy’s war efforts.  
Heads of State have been considered legitimate targets in the most recent 
conflicts. On 21 April 1999, NATO bombed the official residence of President 
Miloševic in Belgrade: officials declared that the building was a legitimate target, 
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although they denied that the aircraft was trying to kill the President himself.62 In 2001, 
the Coalition also bombed homes where Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden might 
have sought refuge during Operation Enduring Freedom.63 Saddam Hussein and his 
sons and collaborators were a declared target of the 2003 air campaign: indeed, the war 
started on 20 March 2003 by a US air attack aimed at killing the President and his 
entourage and went on targeting many presidential palaces and government buildings 
(the so-called ‘decapitation strikes’).64 However, under the customary principle of 
distinction, attacks on heads of State would be legitimate only if they directed military 
operations, otherwise such assassinations would probably amount to extrajudicial 
executions.65 The same can be said about other political leaders: those who take 
strategic decisions can be considered to take a direct part in the hostilities, but not, say, 
a Minister for Education.66 However, during the Kosovo war, NATO listed all 
government ministries among the legitimate military objectives, regardless of their 
contribution to military operations.67 Political leaders were also extensively attacked 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom.68 If political leaders and military chiefs may be 
targeted wherever they are, it is likely that even their family members and other 
civilians will die. For instance, the Iraqi Al Firdos bunker was bombed by the Allied 
forces on 13 February 1991 as it was thought to be the headquarters of the Ba’ath 
Party’s secret police: unfortunately, also their wives and children were there and 200-
300 civilians died in the attack.69 The village of Qalaye Niazi (Niazi Kala), in the 
Afghani Paktia province, was reported to be a Taliban stronghold by a regional warlord 
and it was bombed by a B-52 and two B-1B on 29 December 2001: at least 52 civilians 
died, among which 25 children, according to UN sources.70 According to Major Bill 
Harrison of the US Central Command, it was a legitimate military target, since there 
were Al-Qaeda and/or Taliban leaders living in the village.71 Even in this case, the 
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problem must be solved in the light of the principle of proportionality, balancing the 
military advantage and the collateral damage to civilians. Moreover, the attacker must 
adopt all precautions to avoid or minimize damage to civilians and civilian property. 
This does not appear to have happened during the ‘decapitation strikes’ in Operation 
Iraqi Freedom, which were very rapidly planned and executed due to time constraints, 
only relying on imprecise coordinates obtained from satellite phones and faulty 
intelligence and thus causing dozens of civilian casualties. 72 
 
 
 3. OLD LAW, NEW TARGETS? 
 
The first definition of ‘military objective’ as far as air warfare is concerned is 
contained in the 1923 Hague Rules: ‘an objective whereof the total or partial destruction 
would constitute an obvious military advantage for the belligerent’.73 To clarify the 
definition, the Rules provide an illustrative list of military objectives.74 No definition 
appears in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, although the term ‘military objective’ is often 
employed.75 According to Article 52 (2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, in so far as 
objects are concerned, military objectives are ‘those objects which by their nature, 
location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose 
total and partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the 
time, offers a definite military advantage’.76 There is no doubt that this definition 
applies to air bombardments, since - as noted above - Section I of Part IV of Additional 
Protocol I also deals with attacks from the air against objectives on land (Article 49 (3) 
of the Protocol). The definition incorporated in Article 52 (2) of  Additional Protocol I, 
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which according to the ICTY Final Report reflects customary law,77 also appears in the 
military manuals of Germany,78 Australia,79 Canada,80 United Kingdom.81  
The United States position is somehow contradictory. While the 1976 USAF 
Pamphlet and the 1998 USAF Intelligence Targeting Guide have accepted the 
Protocol’s definition to the letter and although the United States acknowledged that the 
definition contained in Protocol I is declaratory of customary international law,82 the 
2002 US Joint Doctrine for Targeting requires that the destruction, capture or 
neutralization of the object offer a military advantage, without this being qualified as 
‘definite’.83 The adjective ‘definite’ rules out potential or not precisely determined 
advantages, thus prohibiting air attacks the only aim of which is to undermine the 
morale of the population.84 This means that, in the light of the 2002 document, 
bombardments the goal of which is to exasperate the population to make them rouse 
against the government are not unlawful. It has also to be recalled that the United 
States’ definition of ‘military objective’ with regard to naval warfare is also wider than 
that contained in Additional Protocol I, since it covers all objects which ‘effectively 
contribute to the enemy’s war-fighting or war sustaining capability’:85 this definition, 
which has recently been reaffirmed in the instructions issued by the Department of 
Defense for the military commissions responsible for trying al-Qaeda suspects,86 is 
considered by the Annotated Supplement to the Commander’s Handbook on the Law of 
Naval Operations ‘as declarative of the customary rule’, although little evidence is 
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provided to uphold this view. If ‘war fighting’ can be considered as equivalent of 
‘military action’, ‘war sustaining’ is much broader, since it includes activities not 
directly connected to the hostilities, and the use of this expression, which was rejected 
by the San Remo Round Table,87 entails the possibility to attack political and financial 
targets in order to ‘persuade’ the enemy to stop fighting. In a previous edition of the 
Commander’s Handbook, though, it was stated that ‘[t]his variation of the definition 
contained in Additional Protocol I, Article 52 (2) is not intended to alter its meaning, 
and is accepted by the United States as declarative of the customary rule’.88 It is also 
worth noting that, as far as criminal responsibility is concerned, the definition contained 
in Article 8 (2) (b) (iv) of the Rome Statute establishing an International Criminal Court 
(ICC) replaces the narrow expression ‘concrete and direct military advantage’ with the 
more expansive ‘concrete and direct overall military advantage’ and requires the 
collateral damage to be clearly excessive. At the Rome Conference, however, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) expressed the view that if ‘overall’ 
indicates ‘that a particular target can have an important military advantage that can be 
felt over a lengthy period of time and affect military action in areas other than the 
vicinity of the target itself’, then ‘this meaning is included in the existing wording of 
Additional Protocol I’ and ‘the inclusion of the word “overall” is redundant’.89  
However that may be, for States parties to Additional Protocol I, in order that an 
object may be considered a military objective and therefore be attacked without 
violating the principle of distinction, two cumulative elements must be present at the 
same time: it must effectively contribute to the military operations, or, at least, be about 
to do it, and it must offer a definite military advantage. In fact, there may be objectives 
which are lawful per se, but the destruction of which does not offer a military 
advantage.90 Article 52 (2) provides for the criteria to evaluate whether the object 
complies with the first requirement: in particular, one has to take into account its nature, 
location, purpose or use (in this case, the concurrence is alternative).91 As to the second 
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requirement, a point which is not expressly addressed by the Protocol is who has to gain 
the definite military advantage deriving from the destruction, capture or neutralization 
of the objective.92 This is particularly important in coalition wars, such as the most 
recent conflicts. However, it seems a reasonable interpretation of Article 52 (2) that the 
military advantage is to be referred to the attacker considered as a ‘team’, even when it 
is an alliance formed by contingents of different nationalities, providing that they fight 
for the same goal, ie their operations are coordinated and there is some kind of military 
integration. This seems the view upheld by the 2002 US Joint Doctrine for Targeting, 
according to which ‘“military advantage” is not restricted to tactical gains but is linked 
to the full context of a war strategy’.93 The so-called ‘deception targets’ are therefore 
legitimate when used to divert the attention of enemy troops to some location other than 
the eventual target of the allies’ principal attack.  
Apart from defining the notion of military objective, the Protocol puts some 
objects under special protection, namely works and installations containing dangerous 
forces (dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations), the natural environment, 
objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, cultural objects and 
places of worship. The following pages will examine other targets which are not 
expressly dealt with by the Protocol but which have been frequently attacked in the 
most recent conflicts involving the use of air power. 
Broadcasting facilities. Communication nodes have been a high priority in all 
recent armed conflicts. Media and broadcasting systems were included in the target list 
both in Operation Desert Storm and in Operation Allied Force.94 On 23 April 1999, 
NATO aircraft intentionally bombed the headquarters of the RTS in Belgrade, killing 
between 10 and 17 civilians.95 According to the Organization, it was a lawful target, 
since the station was used for military purposes, as part of the control mechanism and of 
the propaganda machinery.96 The fact that the station was reactivated after a few hours 
and was not reattacked could be a sign that there was no military advantage gained from 
its destruction. The ICTY Final Report, however, concluded that the building was a 
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legitimate military objective, because it was aimed mainly at disabling the Serbian 
military command and control system and at destroying the apparatus that kept 
Milošević in power.97 In any case, regardless of any consideration on the lawfulness of 
the target, the respect of the principle of proportionality can be seriously questioned. On 
12 November 2001, the Kabul office of Al-Jazeera news television was hit by a guided 
bomb,98 and other radio/television stations were attacked because they were used as 
means of propaganda by the Taliban.99 In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States 
bombed the Ministry of Information, the Baghdad Television Studio and Broadcast 
Facility and the Abu Ghraib Television Antennae Broadcast Facility.100 US military 
officials had previously asserted that Iraqi television was a legitimate target, since 
cutting communications links between Saddam Hussein and its people was an important 
goal of the campaign.101 The fact that the Iraqi television had showed images of dead 
and captured US soldiers thus breaching the letter and the spirit of the III Geneva 
Convention raised suspicions that the attack was motivated to stop propaganda against 
the Coalition. However, the British Secretary for defence Geoff Hoon appeared more 
cautious, saying that ‘[t]elevision stations are not directly targeted in that sense, [but 
because] they are part of the military command and control structures’.102 
In providing that a limited number of refuges intended to shelter movable cultural 
property in the event of armed conflict and of centres containing monuments and other 
immovable cultural property of very great importance may be placed under special 
protection if they are situated at an adequate distance from an important military 
objective such as, inter alia, a broadcasting station, Article 8 (1) of the 1954 Hague 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 
suggests that this kind of facilities may be attacked.103 Additional Protocol I does not 
expressly mention broadcasting facilities, but from the general definition contained in 
Article 52 (2), it might be implied that they can be military objectives if they contribute 
effectively to military action and if their total or partial destruction, capture or 
neutralization offers a definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the 
time. This means that the bombing of a station that broadcasts civilian programming 
                                                          
97
 Para 76. This conclusion is criticised by P Benvenuti ‘The ICTY Prosecutor and the Review of the 
NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ 12 EJIL (2001) 522-524. 
98
 MW Herold ‘A Dossier on Civilian Victims of United States’ Aerial Bombing of Afghanistan: A 
Comprehensive Accounting’ (March 2002) <http://www.cursor.org/stories/civilian_deaths.htm>. 
99
 R Cryer above n 16 at 55. 
100
 Human Rights Watch above n 49 at 46-49. 
101
 See the declaration of a senior CENTCOM official quoted in Human Rights Watch above n 49 at 48-
49. 
102
 M Tempest ‘Hoon: TV stations can be targets’ The Guardian (26 March 2003) 
<http://politics.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/0,12956,922285,00.html>. 
103
 Paragraph 7 of the 1956 ICRC Draft Rules includes in the list of military objectives broadcasting 
stations ‘of fundamental military importance’. 
 16 
only would be unlawful: in fact, its destruction to undermine civilian morale or to 
psychologically harass the population would not offer a definite military advantage and 
it would not contribute effectively to the war efforts (even if this would weaken the 
political support to the government).104 On the contrary, if the station is part of the 
military communication system (the so-called C3: Command, Control and 
Communication), it would obviously be a military objective.105 Even in this case, 
though, the requirement of the definite military advantage should be met: this means 
that the bombing of one radio or TV broadcasting site would probably be unlawful if 
there were dozens of them around the country. Further, there would be no reason to 
destroy an urban broadcasting facility, as happened in Belgrade, if the same advantage 
can be gained by destroying transmitters.  
It has been suggested that a broadcasting station might also constitute a military 
objective when it is employed to incite the population to commit war crimes or crimes 
against humanity as in the case of Radio Mille Collines in Rwanda in 1994, or acts of 
violence against the forces that supply humanitarian assistance with the authorization of 
the United Nations,106 and, finally, when the station ‘is the nerve system that keeps a 
warmonger in power and thus perpetrates the war effort’.107 The latter case seems to 
refer to countries where there is no freedom of the press and the control on the media 
allows a dictator to dominate the population. On the contrary, it is doubtful whether the 
propaganda function only could turn a civilian target into a military one, since there 
would be no effective contribution to military action from their destruction and the 
military advantage would not be ‘definite’.108 However, consistently with the 2002 Joint 
Doctrine for Targeting, which does not require the military advantage to be ‘definite’, 
for the United States a broadcasting station is a lawful military objective even when it is 
used only for propaganda purposes, while for the Europeans it can be attacked only 
when it is part of the military communication system. In the above mentioned case of 
the NATO attack on the RTS in Belgrade, there seemed to be disagreement between the 
United States, France and Italy about the legitimacy of the target, which caused the 
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postponement of the action.109 Even the United Kingdom refused to take part in the 
attack, which was carried out by the US air force only.110 The same disagreement seems 
to have existed between the US and the UK with regard to the attacks on the Iraqi 
television.111 However, it can be difficult to draw the line between military 
communication and propaganda, especially when the station is used to exhort soldiers 
and population to resist and fight the enemy. 
Economic targets. The strategic bombardment of economic targets was first 
theorized by the Allied in Casablanca in January 1943 in order to progressively destroy 
the German economic and industrial infrastructures, exasperate the population and 
consequently prejudice the enemy’s military operations.112 During the Second World 
War, in fact, all industries of the belligerents were converted to sustain the military 
effort and almost every activity and adult individual was connected with military 
purposes.113 Additional Protocol I does not expressly mention economic targets, but the 
ICRC Commentary reminds that the 1956 list included among military objectives only 
the ‘[i]ndustries of fundamental importance for the conduct of the war’.114 Likewise, 
according to the German Joint Services Regulations, only economic objectives that 
make an effective contribution to military action can be considered lawful targets,115 
and the same view is contained in the 1998 USAF Intelligence Targeting Guide.116 It is 
thus clear that industries which produce weapons or material to support the military 
effort may be attacked,117 while installations which carry out industrial activities of 
scant importance for the conduct of war may not: a tobacco factory or a warehouse 
which contains stationery material do not contribute effectively to military action and 
their destruction, capture or neutralization does not offer a definite military advantage. 
The same can be said about attacks on stock exchanges and banking systems,118 while 
this conclusion is controversial with regard to the supply industry of armaments 
production and subcontractors of the defence industry.119 As far as refineries are 
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concerned, they are usually considered military objectives.120 NATO aircraft bombed 
many refineries in 1999 during Operation Allied Force,121 the most famous case being 
the bombing of the Pančevo petrochemical plant, 16 km from Belgrade: according to 
NATO officials, despite being a civilian facility, the complex produced gasoline and 
other products for the Yugoslavian army and was considered ‘a very, very important 
refinery and strategic target, as important as tactical targets inside Kosovo’.122 In 1987 
and 1988, Iranian offshore oil installations in the Persian Gulf were also considered by 
the US legitimate military targets and attacked, but, in its Judgment of 6 November 
2003, the ICJ did not deal with this specific topic and centred its attention on the jus ad 
bellum aspects of the case.123 In any case, the destruction of refineries and oil platforms 
must not cause environmental damage as provided by Article 55 of Additional Protocol 
I.124  
What about export goods which are the principal financial source of a country’s 
continuation of war effort? According to the British-American Claims Commission, the 
destruction of plantations by the federal forces during the American civil war was 
lawful, since the sale of cotton supplied funds to the Confederate States to buy weapons 
and munitions.125 Nonetheless, the San Remo Manual Explanation states that ‘the 
connection between the exports and military action would be too remote’.126 During 
Operation Desert Storm, Jordanian oil tankers that travelled in the Amman-Baghdad 
highway were attacked by the Coalition.127 Apart from being owned by citizens of a 
non-belligerent State (Jordan), there was no evidence that the transported fuel was 
directed to sustain Iraq’s military effort. Furthermore, Iraq did not gain any financial 
advantage from the export of such goods, since the oil was taken by Jordan as a 
repayment for loans: there was therefore no definite military advantage to be gained by 
the destruction of the tankers.128 
According to the 2002 US Joint Doctrine for Targeting, lawful targets also include 
economic facilities that ‘indirectly but effectively support and sustain the enemy’s 
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warfighting capability’.129 This is coherent with the broader definition of ‘military 
objective’ contained in the document and highlighted above, and implies, inter alia, that 
exports and even food industries which produce fare to feed soldiers to the front might 
be attacked. This view, however, is not consistent with the definition of ‘military 
objective’ contained in Additional Protocol I, which is generally thought to reflect 
customary law, even by the Unites States itself.130 
Electric generating stations. The status of the electric generating stations is a 
particularly moot point. Additional Protocol I deals expressly only with nuclear 
generating stations because of the great risk their destruction might pose (Article 56). 
Of course, a power plant which provides electricity for the production of arms is a 
legitimate target. More often, the plants also have a civilian function, eg they allow 
hospitals to function and they provide electricity to purify and distribute water. As 
observed, ‘[e]lectricity is the life’s blood of modern-day state, especially in the core 
urban centers’ and ‘[c]ivil support has become so dependent upon electricity that even 
temporary interruption can wreak havoc upon the most advanced and redundant power 
grids’.131 In the most recent conflicts, however, electric generating stations have been 
considered military objectives.132 During the Gulf War, attacks on electrical generation 
facilities were particularly heavy and caused the shut-down of water distribution and 
purification and of sewage treatment plants, with consequent lack of potable water, 
which allowed the Iraqi Government to accuse the coalition of attempted genocide.133 If 
– as it was suggested134 - this had been implemented to cause political turmoil and lead 
to the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein’s regime (and not to degradate the enemy’s air-
defence system), then the attacks would have been unlawful, since there would have 
been no definite military advantage gained from the destruction of the facilities.135 
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However, applying the 2002 US Joint Doctrine for Targeting, which does not require 
the military advantge to be ‘definite’, one would come to the opposite conclusion. In 
Afghanistan, the electrical grids in Kandahar and near the Kajakai dam were destroyed 
in late October 2001 by the Coalition led by the United States, leaving the cities of 
Kandahar and Lashkargah without all power supplies.136 In Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
attacks were directed at power distribution facilities instead of generation facilities, and 
they were carried out with carbon fiber bombs.137 Electricity and water supplies in Basra 
and al-Nasiriyya were cut off by US/UK attacks.138 Power and water supplies were also 
interrupted in Baghdad, because of - according to some allegations - a ‘black-out 
bomb’, although the Coalition denied responsibility.139 However, the electricity network 
was largely left undamaged, probably in order to facilitate the post-war reconstruction. 
If the electric power plant is located at or in the vicinity of an installation 
containing dangerous forces such a dam or a dyke, States parties to Additional Protocol 
I should also apply Article 56. Therefore, the plant could be bombed only if it is used in 
regular, significant and direct support of military operations and the attack is the only 
feasible way to terminate such support, or if the action does not cause the release of 
dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population. 
Lines of communication (railroads, highways, bridges, airports, navigable rivers 
and canals, tunnels). The 1976 USAF Pamphlet admits that controversy exists over 
whether, and the circumstances under which, lines of communication can be military 
objectives.140 Supply routes, bridges and other lines of communication were included in 
the list of intentionally attacked targets by the Coalition in the 1991 Gulf War and by 
NATO in Yugoslavia.141 The airports of the main Afghani cities (Kabul, Herat, 
Kandahar, Zaranj, Mazar-i-Sharif) were also attacked by the Coalition during the US-
led campaign, and lines of communication were disrupted.142 The Saddam International 
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Airport was repeatedly bombed during the 2003 war against Iraq and a US missile 
targeted a bridge on the Iraqi side of the Syrian border, accidentally hitting a bus and 
killing 23 Syrian workers.143 Applying the customary definition of ‘military objective’ 
contained in Article 52 (2) of Additional Protocol I, to be lawful targets, the bridge, 
airport, route or canal has to contribute effectively to military action and its total or 
partial destruction, capture or neutralization has to offer a definite military advantage in 
the circumstances ruling at the time. A bridge which is too narrow to accommodate 
large military vehicles would probably not be a legitimate military objective, and 
neither would a bridge which is broad enough to allow the transit of tanks if no military 
operations are occurring or likely to occur on the other side of the river. Besides - as it 
has been noted - ‘only the destruction of all forms of certain types of dual purpose 
object would make an effective contribution to military action and offer a definite 
military advantage’. This means that ‘[i]f there are … two bridges across a strategically 
significant river, the destruction of one only may give no military advantage; only the 
destruction of both would achieve this objective’.144 The destruction of a bridge which 
has just a symbolic significance (as was the case - according to Human Rights Watch – 
of the bridge over the Danube in Novi Sad145) is unlawful, since it does not offer a 
definite military advantage.146  
Only the main lines of communication, which have a significant strategic 
importance, constitute military objectives, and not every city street.147 This opinion has 
been upheld by the ICRC148 and is suggested by Article 8 of the 1954 Cultural 
Convention, according to which refuges for cultural property must be located at an 
adequate distance from, inter alia, ‘a port or railway station of relative importance or a 
main line of communication’.149 In the Pentagon’s target list in Operation Desert Storm, 
not every railroads and bridges were included, but only those connecting Iraqi military 
forces with logistical support centres,150 and in Operation Iraqi Freedom air sorties 
concentrated on major communication nodes.151 During the Kosovo conflict, the 
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railroad bridge at Grdelica Gorge was attacked by the Coalition because it was ‘part of 
the integrated communications supply in Serbia’.152 In this case, even Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch acknowledged that the military use made the 
bridge a legitimate target. The same happened to the Luzane bridge,  which was on the 
main re-supply route between the two main cities of Kosovo, Niš and Priština. On the 
other hand, France refused to attack the bridges on the Danube, since ‘they [the 
Americans] read the Geneva Conventions [in a different way] and they were prepared to 
go and Europeans were not’:153 it seemed that seven of the bridges attacked had no 
military functions at the time and could not thus be considered as military targets.  
More limitations apply if the bridge is a historical monument, such as Mostar 
Bridge, which was destroyed by the Croatian guns during the Bosnian conflict. Another 
limitation derives from the principle of proportionality: if the roads, bridges etc are the 
only feasible way to provide humanitarian relief to the civilian population, or to allow 
the population to move to safer areas, their destruction would probably be 
disproportionate with respect to the military advantage gained. On the other hand, if the 
destruction of a bridge is of fundamental importance for the occupation of a strategic 
zone, it is legitimate that some houses may be hit. Moreover, before attacking a bridge 
or road which is used both by civilians and the military, the attacker should determine 
whether there are alternative targets the destruction of which offers a similar military 
advantage but less risk to civilians, or whether there is a time of the day that would 
reduce potential harm (see, eg, the NATO attack on the Grdelica Gorge railroad bridge, 
which took place in the middle of the day, when a civilian passenger train was crossing 
it, or on the Luzane bridge, which was regularly used by civilian traffic but yet attacked 
during the day, or again on the Varvarin bridge, which was attacked during a religious 
holiday, when the streets were busier than usual154).  
Commercial means of transport. This is another example of dual-use objects. As 
mentioned above, during Operation Desert Storm, coalition aircraft bombed civilian 
vehicles carrying Iraqi oil to Jordan. In the light of Additional Protocol I, the attack was 
unlawful, since the tankers did not made any contribution to Iraq’s military efforts (they 
were carrying fuel to Jordan to be used in that country), nor their destruction offered a  
definite military advantage (Iraq did not earn any money from the trade).155 The US’s 
view is however less strict. According to the 1998 USAF Intelligence Targeting Guide, 
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‘[m]odern transportation and communications systems are deemed military objectives 
because they are used heavily for military purposes in intense conflicts’.156 This opinion 
is shared by Rogers, according to whom ‘[c]ivilian oil tankers, lorries and railway 
wagons are not normally military objectives, but it is submitted that if intelligence 
reports suggest that the enemy plan to use such vehicles for military purposes, they can 
be attacked to prevent them being used for those purposes’.157 Therefore, a hypothetical 
future military use (and not their present destination, as required by Protocol I) would 
be sufficient to turn these objects into military objectives. In the Iraqi vehicles case, 
however, the Pentagon stated that they had been attacked by mistake, since they were 
thought to be mobile Scud launchers.158 
Animals. International humanitarian law has always focused on the protection of 
persons. It does not provide for specific rules protecting animals as such in times of 
armed conflict. Of course, if they are used for military purposes (eg, cavalry horses, or 
the dolphins employed to clear mines from the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom159), they can be targeted and killed, but what happens if they 
do not participate in the military effort? Obviously, they neither fall within the 
definition of ‘civilian person’ under Article 50 (1) of Additional Protocol I, nor within 
the definition of ‘civilian object’ under Article 52 (2), which appears to encompass only 
inanimate things: hence, they do not enjoy the general protection provided in Articles 
51 and 52.160 This legal vacuum is only partially filled by Article 54 (if the animals are 
indispensable for the survival of the civilian population, namely livestock animals like 
cows, sheep, chickens, etc), and by Articles 35 and 55 (if the damage to the fauna is 
widespread, long-term and severe: see discussion in Section V of this article) of 
Protocol I.161 In any case, the protection of animals would be linked to that of a 
humanitarian/ecological interest of prominent importance. The 1972 World Cultural and 
Heritage Convention could also come into consideration, since it provides that parties 
must refrain from any deliberate measure which might damage directly or indirectly the 
natural heritage as defined in Articles 1 and 2.162 The Convention, however, is not 
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expressly applicable in time of armed conflict. Some protection might also derive from 
the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, which forbids, inter alia, the use of toxic 
chemicals, namely ‘any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes 
can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to human or animals’.163 
 
 
4. COLLATERAL DAMAGE AND PROPORTIONALITY  
IN CONTEMPORARY AERIAL BOMBARDMENT 
 
Civilian population and property may be incidentally hit, as the collateral result of 
an attack directed against military objectives, even if the attacker was aware of such 
possibility: according to the 1998 USAF Intelligence Targeting Guide, ‘such incidental 
casualties are inevitable during armed conflict’.164 In this case, the principle of 
proportionality has to be taken into account. The most recent armed conflicts have 
showed a growing attention towards the need to avoid civilian casualties, mostly 
because of the fear of a public relation disaster. This eagerness to avoid high levels of 
civilian casualties was a key feature of all major war operations conducted by the 
United States since the 1991 Gulf War, and was particularly emphasized in Kosovo, 
Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom.165 In Operation Iraqi Freedom, lawyers 
constantly advised the UK and US military and political leaders on which targets could 
be hit, identifying legitimate target throughout the enemy’s territory and evaluating the 
risk of collateral damage: when the risk was too high, the targets were set aside or 
mitigated.166  
Under Article 51 (5) (b) of Additional Protocol I, a military objective cannot be 
attacked if such attack ‘may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury 
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated’.167 This 
provision is also contained in para 456 of the German Joint Services Regulations, in the 
1996 British defence doctrine, in the US 1976 Air Force Pamphlet (5-10) and in the 
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2002 Joint Doctrine for Targeting (at A-1).168 The customary status of the principle of 
proportionality as expressed by Additional Protocol I has also been acknowledged by 
the ICTY in the above mentioned Kupreškić judgment.169 If the status of the principle of 
proportionality is undisputed, its application to concrete situations is problematic, 
especially in air warfare, where the armed forces of the attacker could return home with 
zero casualties, while the attacked belligerent with less advanced technology could 
sustain heavy losses (as happened in Kosovo). As noted, ‘[t]he intellectual process of 
balancing the various elements is so complicated, needs to take into account such a huge 
amount of data and so many factors, that any attempt to design a formula which is both 
comprehensive and precise would be ridiculous’.170 This is because the two elements to 
be balanced against each other (the military advantage and the civilian losses) are 
heterogeneous. The evaluation has to be made on a case-by-case basis, taking the 
context into account under an honest and reasonable bona fide appraisal of the 
information available to the responsible person at the relevant time, and not on the basis 
of the hindsight.171 For instance, the principle of proportionality would tolerate a higher 
level of collateral damage if the attack concerned civilians working in a weapon factory, 
while it should be interpreted strictly if among the civilians at risk there were women 
and children,172 or if the targets were objects mainly used by the civilian population in 
an urban area.173  
In the Kupreškić judgment, the ICTY argued that ‘in case of repeated attacks, all 
or most of them falling within the grey area between indisputable legality and 
unlawfulness, it might be warranted to conclude that the cumulative effect of such acts 
entails that they may not be in keeping with international law. Indeed, this pattern of 
military conduct may turn out to jeopardise excessively the lives and assets of civilians, 
contrary to the demands of humanity’.174 According to the ICTY Final Report, however, 
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this statement must be interpreted as referring to ‘an overall assessment of the totality of 
civilian victims as against the goals of the military campaign’, since ‘the mere 
cumulation of such instances, all of which are deemed to have been lawful, cannot ipso 
facto be said to amount to a crime’ (para 52). This interpretation is consistent with the 
reservations issued, inter alia, by Italy, Australia, New Zealand, Belgium, Canada, 
Spain, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom when signing and/or 
ratifying the Protocol, according to which the military advantage has to be estimated 
with regard to the operation as a whole, and not to the single action itself or to the entire 
war.175 
The principle of proportionality has also to be interpreted in the light of the 
evolving military, political and technological situation. In the following pages, this 
article will examine some recent trends which might transform the notion of how much 
collateral damage is proportional. To begin with, in the 1991 Gulf War, long-term 
civilian casualties resulting from starvation and diseases or damage to the living 
environment were not taken into account as part of the proportionality equation.176 This 
practice seems to have changed. In the Kosovo conflict, transformer and distribution 
facilities were specifically targeted so as to avoid long-term impact on the civilian 
population. For the first time, the US employed graphite bombs to cut off Serbia electric 
power system without destroying infrastructures.177 Operation Iraqi Freedom was 
designed as a war of maximum effect and minimum destruction (also because the US 
aimed at ejecting Saddam Hussein from Iraq and then remaining on), by threatening 
Saddam to ‘shock and awe’ but only delivering this if necessary. As a retired Israeli 
general observed, ‘[i]f the U.S. were to rely on bombing civilian infrastructures like 
refineries or electrical grids, they would be shooting themselves in the foot’.178 The 
most powerful weapon was therefore psychological.  
A contemporary concept of the principle of proportionality should also protect not 
only civilians and civilian property, but the natural environment as well. This opinion 
has been enhanced by the ICJ in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the legality of the threat 
or use of weapons: ‘States must take environmental considerations into account when 
assessing what is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military 
objectives. Respect for the environment is one of the elements that go to assessing 
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whether an action is in conformity with the principles of necessity and 
proportionality’.179 Another recent trend is to interpret the principle of proportionality 
differently according to the intensity and the scope or the aim of the conflict. When the 
goal of the operation is not the enemy’s defeat but is more limited, the concept of 
‘military advantage’ loses much of its meaning. This happens for the so-called 
‘humanitarian interventions’ or ‘peace-enforcement operations’, which do not always fit 
into the ‘classic’ types of armed conflicts envisaged by the framers of Additional 
Protocol I. For instance, the political aim of Operation Allied Force was ‘to stop the 
killing in Kosovo and the brutal destruction of human lives and properties; to put an end 
to the appalling humanitarian situation that is now unfolding in Kosovo and create the 
conditions for refugees to be able to return; to create the conditions for a political 
solution to the crisis in Kosovo based upon the Rambouillet agreement’, while the 
military goal was ‘to attack, degrade, disrupt and further diminish the capacity of the 
Serb war machine to perpetrate these atrocities against its own people’.180 The UK 
Secretary of State for defence stated that ‘[t]his is not a war, it is an operation designed 
to prevent what everybody recognises is about to be a humanitarian catastrophe: ethnic 
cleansing, savagery (…). That is what we are in there to prevent, that is not war, it is a 
humanitarian objective very clearly defined as such’.181 It has been suggested that in 
interventions carried out with humanitarian purposes, the principle of proportionality 
has to be interpreted strictly, attaching more importance to collateral damage and less to 
military advantage, and thus tolerating fewer civilian casualties.182 Moreover, only 
‘pure’ military objectives could be attacked, but not dual-use facilities, ie those which 
are used for both military and civilian purposes.183 This position, appealing as it may 
look, cannot be shared. Humanitarian interventions, peace enforcement operations and 
‘wars on terrorism’ are armed conflicts, notwithstanding their limited goals. It is true 
that, as ackowledged by the ICTY Final Report, ‘[t]he precise linkage between jus ad 
bellum and jus in bellum is not completely resolved’,184 but humanitarian law treaties 
do not distinguish between different kinds of intervention according to their purposes. 
The preamble of Additional Protocol I states that its provisions apply ‘in all 
circumstances to all persons who are protected by those instruments, without any 
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adverse distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the causes 
espoused by or attributed to the Parties to the conflict’. This position is confirmed in the 
2002 US Joint Doctrine for Targeting, according to which ‘the armed forces of the 
United States will comply with the LOAC [Law of Armed Conflicts] during all armed 
conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized’.185 With regard to Kosovo, NATO 
declarations themselves expressed the Organization’s intention to abide to the laws of 
war rules on targeting.186 The German Joint Service Regulations expressly states that 
‘the rules of international humanitarian law shall also be observed in peace-keeping 
operations and other military operations of the United Nations’.187 The principle of the 
equality of the belligerents is a well-established one: the application of humanitarian 
law cannot be different for the good and for the bad guys.188 If it was stricter for the 
former, this could backfire and lead to paradoxical results: for instance, saying that 
NATO would have had to comply with stricter rules because it was carrying out a 
humanitarian intervention would have left more freedom of action to the Serbs to kill 
Kosovars and would have postponed Milošević’s surrender.  
 
 
5. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS  
IN THE SELECTION OF TARGETS 
 
Environmental considerations can have a double relevance in target selection. 
First of all, the natural environment might be targeted as such, although this has not 
frequently happened in recent armed conflicts. A well-known example is the defoliation 
and killing by the Americans of inland and mangrove in South Vietnam in order to deny 
cover to Vietkong (1962-1971). More recently, the Yugoslavian authorities denounced 
air strikes against protected areas, such as the Fruška Gora, Kopaonik national parks in 
Serbia and the Skadar Lake in Montenegro. Second, damage to the environment could 
be the collateral consequence of attacks aimed at other targets. During the Kosovo war, 
NATO aircraft targeted the Pančevo fertilizer, oil refinery and petrochemical complex, 
which was thought to be used to supply gasoline and other material to the Serbian 
army.189 However, considerable quantities of toxic materials reached the Danube River 
and, through it, Romania, Ukraine and Bulgaria, and the chemicals contaminated food 
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crops and fish stocks. The same can be said of the bombing of the Zastava industrial 
complex in Kragujevac, which produced extensive pollution to the natural environment, 
including the Morava River.190 It has also to be recalled that the Western powers made 
large use of depleted uranium munitions in all recent conflicts, even though it is 
debatable that today’s international law prohibits such weapons.191  
Only indirectly are some provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions applicable 
to the targeting of the environment.192 It is the case of Article 53 of the IV Convention, 
which forbids the destruction of real and personal property by the Occupying Power. 
Nonetheless, the word ‘property’ leaves room for ambiguity as to whether it can 
encompass natural goods. In Additional Protocol I some provisions might indirectly 
protect the environment from attacks, eg Article 48 (principle of distinction between 
civilians and combatants), Article 52 (protection of civilian property), Article 54 (2) 
(prohibition to destroy objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, 
such as agricultural areas), Article 56 (protection of works and installations containing 
dangerous forces). However, under the emotional spur caused by the systematic 
destruction of forests by the Americans during the Vietnam war, the 1974-1977 Geneva 
diplomatic Conference decided to insert in the future Additional Protocol I two specific 
provisions protecting the environment in time of war: Article 35 (3)193 and Article 55 
(1).194 While the former aims at protecting the environment as such, the goal of the 
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latter is to protect the civilian population against the effects of hostilities.195 There is no 
reference to military necessity: the articles apply regardless of any advantage the 
operation might provide to the attacker. Not any method or means of warfare which 
produces damage to the environment is forbidden, but only those which cause, 
intentionally or not (providing that it was foreseeable),196 ‘widespread, long-term and 
severe damage’ to the ecosystem.197 The very same wording is employed by the 
preamble of the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects, and by Article 8 (2) (b) (iv) of the ICC Statute, while Article 1 
(1) of the 1976 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques (En-Mod Convention) requires the methods 
and means to be ‘widespread, long-lasting or severe’:198 as far as Protocol I is 
concerned, therefore, all three requirements must be met, while in the 1976 Convention 
one of them is sufficient. As to the meaning of the three adjectives, neither the Protocol 
is of help, nor the En-Mod Convention, since its Rapport explicatif makes clear that the 
Convention ‘is not intended to prejudice the interpretation of the same or similar terms 
if used in connection with any other international agreement’.199 It is generally thought, 
however, that, as far as the Protocol is concerned, ‘long-term’ refers to years or even 
decades,200 and this has pushed some authors to exclude that the provisions in question 
might apply to operations (such an air bombardment) in a conventional war.201 This 
interpretation cannot be shared: widespread, long-term and severe damages might be the 
consequence of the use of depleted uranium munitions, or of the bombing and 
subsequent destruction of oil rigs in enclosed or semi-enclosed sea, as happened during 
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the Iran-Iraq war.202 An area might also be rendered useless for decades because of live 
shells (eg, the unexploded bomblets of cluster bombs203). As to the above mentioned 
bombing by NATO of the Pančevo and Zastava industrial complexes, the harmful 
consequences on the Danube and Morava Rivers and the surrounding environment 
could surely be ‘severe’ and ‘widespread’, but probably not ‘long-term’, if this 
requirement implies decades. This is also the conclusion of the ICTY Final Report, 
according to which the environmental damage caused during the bombardments did not 
reach the Additional Protocol I threshold.204 
In any case - as noted by a commentator - the implementation of the 
environmental provisions of Protocol I might lead to paradoxical results. For instance, if 
a nuclear facility which is located in an uninhabited region were producing nuclear 
weapons to be used against the enemy, this could bomb and destroy it without breaching 
the principle of proportionality. However, the attack would probably violate Articles 35 
(3) and 55 (1), although it would save thousands of lives (those potentially killed by the 
nuclear weapons produced in the facility).205 
According to the ICTY Final Report, Article 55 of Protocol I ‘may … reflect 
current customary law’.206 The ICJ’s view is not clear: in its 1996 Advisory Opinion of 
the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the Court first states that Articles 35 
and 55 ‘embody a general obligation to protect the natural environment against 
widespread, long-term and severe environmental damage’, and then concedes that these 
provisions are ‘powerful constraints’ only for the States having subscribed to them.207 
The customary status of Articles 35 and 55 of Additional Protocol I is however 
debatable. The United States is still objecting to the provisions in question, because they 
are ‘too broad and ambiguous’.208 In Washington’s opinion, only the destruction of the 
environment not necessitated by military necessity and carried out wantonly is 
prohibited: damage to the environment is thus only limited by the principles of 
distinction and proportionality and must be balanced against the military advantage 
expected from the operation.209 The same view is contained in the 2004 UK Manual.210 
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Further, according to Article 9 (1) of the Agreement between the European Union and 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the status of the European-led forces 
(Operation Concordia), the Force must respect international conventions regarding the 
protection of the environment, but only ‘subject to the requirements of the operation’, 
which might refer to military necessity.211  
 
 
6. CONCLUSION: A LEGAL FRAMEWORK UNDER STRESS  
 
In the most recent conflicts involving the use of air power, the basic rules of the 
law of targeting (the principles of distinction and proportionality) have generally been 
respected. Indeed, the impact on civilians of aerial operations in Operation Allied Force, 
Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom was less severe than in 
Operation Desert Storm.212 New and improved technologies are of course of great help: 
for instance, the development of a satellite system which determines the accurate 
position of the target so that the weapon can be dropped in all weather conditions even 
without seeing the ground, and the increasing use of precision-guided weapons have 
marked a far cry from the 1990-1991 Gulf War.213 Paradoxically, though, the 
overwhelming military supremacy of one power (the United States) could undermine 
the principle of distinction, since the enemy, having nothing to lose and facing total 
defeat, might be led to desperately use all available methods and means, unlawful ones 
included. The principle of distinction is also weakened by some methods of warfare 
often employed in recent conflicts, such as night bombing and flying at high altitude, 
and by the use of civilians performing military or military related functions throughout 
the operations. 
As far as the principle of proportionality is concerned, the balance between 
collateral damage and military advantage gained from the operation should nowadays 
also take into account the long-term casualties of the attack (ie, those deriving from 
starvation or diseases or from unexploded weapons such as cluster bombs) and the 
damage to the natural environment. On the other hand, it is not possible to share the 
opinion that applies a stricter standard in the proportionality equation in case of the so-
called humanitarian wars, peace-enforcement operations or ‘wars on terrorism’. No 
international humanitarian law instrument draws a distinction between different types of 
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armed conflict according to the aim pursued by the attacker.214 Further, recent practice 
shows that the traditional humanitarian rules have been applied even in operations of 
limited scope, such as Operation Allied Force.  
There are some targets which are not expressly addressed by the existing rules, ie 
dual-use facilities (broadcasting stations, economic installations, electric generating 
facilities, lines of communication, commercial means of transport, etc) and animals. As 
to the former, it is increasingly difficult to determine the relation of a potential target to 
the military effort. Civilian activities are more and more militarized, while the military 
ones are more and more civilianized. Article 52 (2) of Additional Protocol I pays no 
attention to the civilian function performed by the facility, which is not an element to 
take into account when establishing whether the object is a military objective. All one 
could say is that the contribution of the dual-use installation to civilian needs must be 
carefully considered in the proportionality calculus in order to verify if the damage to 
the population is excessive or not.215 An important role might also be played by Article 
57 (3) of Additional Protocol I (which is generally considered as reflecting customary 
law), according to which ‘[w]hen a choice is possible between several military 
objectives for obtaining a  similar military advantage, the objective to be selected shall 
be that the attack on which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives 
and to civilian objects’. Moreover, according to the ICTY, when a rule of humanitarian 
law is vague, it has to be interpreted in the light of the Martens clause, and therefore ‘so 
as to construe as narrowly as possible the discretionary power to attack belligerents and, 
by the same token, so as to expand the protection accorded to civilians’.216  
However that may be, the Europeans have generally applied the definition of 
‘military objective’ contained in Article 52 (2) of Additional Protocol I, and have 
therefore considered lawful only attacks on those dual-use targets which make an 
effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or 
neutralization offers a definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the 
time. On the contrary, according to the 2002 US Joint Doctrine for Targeting, the 
military advantage does not have necessarily to be ‘definite’. Accordingly, the United 
States considers lawful the bombing of a broadcasting station even if it is just used for 
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propaganda purposes, regardless of its being part of the military communication system, 
and also admits the attack on economic facilities which indirectly but effectively 
support the enemy’s warfighting capabilities. Such provisions are not consistent with 
customary international humanitarian law and represent the ius in bello counterpart of 
President Bush’s unorthodox approach to jus ad bellum.  
The most recent armed conflicts also show a trend towards a new concept, the so-
called ‘effects-based warfare’, according to which not all military objectives need to be 
destroyed. The very definition contained in Article 52 (2) of Additional Protocol I 
considers not only the destruction of the objective, but also its neutralization, ie 
‘denying the use of an object to the enemy without necessarily destroying it’.217 For 
instance, while the integrated Iraqi electric grid, used both by the military and by 
civilians, was treated as a military target by the Coalition strategic planners during 
Operation Desert Storm causing widespread criticism, the US aircraft attacked electric 
generating installations in Kosovo in such a way as to cause only temporary 
incapacitation through the use of graphite bombs. As far as we know, in Afghanistan the 
Coalition did not attack economic objectives (but it has to be recalled that the industrial 
infrastructure of that country was virtually non-existent), and in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom the destruction of economic and electric power facilities was limited to the 
minimum extent possible.218 Nevertheless, the new, more cautious approach, far from 
demonstrating a change in the opinio juris, can be explained in the light of the new 
American military strategy, aimed at causing maximum impact but minimum damage, 
in order to preserve infrastructures and so facilitate the reconstruction of the post-war 
occupied enemies.219  
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